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OPINION 
__________________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Antyane Robinson appeals the District Court’s denial 
of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 
2254.  Robinson received a death sentence after a jury 
convicted him of first degree murder and related charges.  For 
the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court. 
 
I. 
 
 On March 13, 1997, following a jury trial in the 
Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas, Robinson was 
convicted of first degree murder of Rashawn Bass, attempted 
criminal homicide of Tara Hodge, and related offenses.  The 
evidence at trial established that, on June 29, 1996, Robinson 
made an unannounced visit to Hodge, his ex-girlfriend, at her 
apartment.  When Robinson discovered that Hodge’s new 
boyfriend, Bass, was taking a shower in the apartment, an 
argument ensued.  Robinson told Hodge to make Bass leave 
the apartment, but Hodge refused and attempted to block 
Robinson from entering the bathroom.  Robinson pulled a 
semiautomatic handgun out of his waistband and shot Hodge 
3 
 
in the head, rendering her unconscious.  Robinson then 
proceeded into the bathroom and shot Bass seven times, 
killing him.  Hodge survived and called the police after she 
regained consciousness. 
 
 At trial, the prosecutor emphasized that Robinson was 
from the “big city,” and that he shot two people for “a 
perceived disrespect.”  See Appendix (“App.”) 164.  The 
prosecutor elicited testimony concerning Robinson’s attempts 
to purchase firearms years before the offense as well as 
Robinson’s possession of a gun, bulletproof vest, 
ammunition, and other military gear.  The trial court also 
admitted evidence seized from Robinson’s home, including 
photographs of Robinson posing with guns.  See 
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 721 A.2d 344, 350 (Pa. 1998) 
(“Robinson I”).  In his closing argument, the prosecutor 
described Robinson as follows: 
 
Now, there was an image projected here, and it’s that 
big city image. . . . Man, I got to carry a gun wherever 
I go.  [Robinson’s] not the person in here that all my 
life I’ve been treated so badly.  This is the image of a 
kind of person capable of forming specific intent to 
kill.  This is a lifestyle.  You look at that and you judge 
these acts carefully. . . . . [A] person that wants to 
project this kind of image, the kind of guy that has to 
drive into Cumberland County and have guns in his 
waistband and his home has to have a bullet proof vest, 
those are the kind of guys I submit to you that say I 
ain’t going to be disrespected, disrespect me and 
you’re going to have to pay. 
 
App. 452-56.   
 
 During the penalty phase of Robinson’s trial, the 
prosecutor elicited testimony indicating that Robinson:  was 
on probation at the time of the murder for a prior assault and 
battery and carrying a deadly weapon, App. 530; violated 
various conditions of his probation, App. 515; and was 
convicted for assaulting another woman, App. 518-19.  The 
prosecutor also described to the jury the purpose of 
aggravating circumstances:  “there are some crimes and the 
manner in which you do them that are more terrible than other 
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ones, and we want to tell people, okay, do the first crime but 
for God sake then stop.”  App. 537.  Explaining the 
applicability of aggravating circumstances to Robinson’s 
case, the prosecutor stated:  “[a]nd then while he is killing 
Rashawn [Bass] another person gets almost killed.  That’s a 
serious thing that we have to stop . . . .”  App. 543.  In 
addition, he described the applicability of the “grave risk” 
aggravating circumstance, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(7), to 
the jury as follows: 
 
Here we’re trying to say, gees, . . . if you’re going to 
kill somebody, don’t create a risk of killing someone 
else.  Because in the course of this killing, and by your 
very verdicts you said, yeah, he killed Rashawn Bass 
and he had the specific intent to do that, and while he’s 
doing that, in the course of that killing, he also created 
grave risk of death to Tara Hodge, and you heard that 
testimony.  The doctor said had that angle changed just 
a bit, that girl would be dead.  You all heard about 
what a vital organ the head is, and that’s just a 
common sense thing.  So if you’re going to create a 
grave risk of death, that puts you in that seat that we’re 
sitting in today. 
 
App. 538.   
 
 Following closing arguments at the penalty phase, 
Robinson’s counsel moved for a jury instruction, pursuant to 
Simmons v. South Carolina, that Robinson would be 
ineligible for parole should he receive a life sentence rather 
than the death penalty.  See 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (holding that 
the jury must be informed that the defendant is ineligible for 
parole when the prosecution raises the defendant’s future 
dangerousness and state law prohibits release on parole for 
capital defendants).  Robinson’s counsel argued that “the 
Commonwealth put . . . the issue of future dangerousness in 
when he said it was a lifestyle choice . . . [and] bringing into 
issue the other shootings makes future dangerousness an 
issue.”  App. 533.  The prosecutor responded:  “I think the 
jurors have a right to hear what his past has been.  I do not 
intend to argue that he will be a future danger.”  Id.  The trial 
court denied defense counsel’s motion and did not give the 
jury a Simmons instruction.   
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 Finally, the trial court gave the following jury charge, 
in pertinent part, regarding aggravating circumstances: 
 
In this case, the aggravating circumstances that are 
being submitted to you for your consideration to 
determine whether the Commonwealth has proven 
them beyond a reasonable doubt are . . . right out of the 
Pennsylvania statute. . . . One, in the commission of 
the criminal homicide defendant knowingly created a 
grave risk of death to Tara Hodge and in addition to 
Rashawn Bass who was the victim of the offense. 
 
App. 560-61.  Robinson’s counsel did not object to this 
instruction.   
 
 The jury found unanimously that two aggravating 
circumstances applied to Robinson:  (1) knowingly creating a 
grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim 
in the commission of a murder, 42. Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
9711(d)(7); and (2) committing a murder while in the 
perpetration of a felony, id. § 9711(d)(6).  The jury also found 
two mitigating circumstances:  (1) Robinson’s youth, id. § 
9711(e)(4); and (2) his future contributions to society, see id. 
§ 9711(e)(8).  After concluding that the aggravating 
circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, see 
id. § 9711(c)(1)(iv), the jury returned a verdict of death.  On 
April 1, 1997, the trial court formally imposed upon Robinson 
a death sentence for first degree murder and a consecutive 
term of imprisonment of six years and nine months to twenty 
years for aggravated assault.  
 
 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed Robinson’s 
conviction and sentence. Robinson I, 721 A.2d 344.  The 
United States Supreme Court denied Robinson’s petition for a 
writ of certiorari.  Robinson v. Pennsylvania, 528 U.S. 1082 
(2000).  On October 16, 2000, Robinson filed a counseled 
petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act 
(“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 9541-9546.  Following 
hearings held on October 10 and 18, November 29, and 
December 14, 2001, the state court denied Robinson’s PCRA 
petition.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the 
6 
 
denial of his PCRA petition.  Commonwealth v. Robinson, 
877 A.2d 433 (Pa. 2005) (“Robinson II”). 
 
 On August 8, 2005, Robinson filed a counseled 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania.  On January 19, 2006, he filed an amended 
petition.  Robinson asserted eighteen grounds for relief, 
including the two that he argues in this appeal:  (1) the state 
trial court violated his due process rights when it declined to 
give a Simmons instruction; and (2) there was insufficient 
evidence to support the jury’s finding of the “grave risk” 
aggravating circumstance, and the trial court improperly 
instructed the jury with regard to this aggravating 
circumstance.   
 
 On September 30, 2011, the District Court denied 
Robinson’s petition.  The District Court found that:  (1) 
“when considered in context, the prosecutor’s questioning 
and comments did not convey a message that Robinson posed 
a threat of future dangerousness if not sentenced to death,” 
and therefore a Simmons instruction was not required, 
Robinson v. Beard, No. 1:05-CV-1603, 2011 WL 4592366, at 
*62 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 2011); and (2) there was “ample 
evidence” to support the jury’s finding that the “grave risk” 
aggravating circumstance applied, and the trial court did not 
improperly instruct the jury, id. at *58.  The court granted a 
certificate of appealability on the issues of “whether the trial 
court’s jury instruction on the “grave risk” aggravating 
circumstance ran afoul of the Eighth Amendment and 
whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding 
that the “grave risk” aggravating circumstance was applicable 
to Robinson.”  Id. at *72.  
 
 Robinson filed a notice of appeal on October 28, 2011.  
Thereafter, he filed a motion in this Court to expand the 
certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) to 
include seven more issues.  We granted a certificate of 
appealability on the additional issue of “whether the state 
supreme court’s determination on direct appeal that the trial 
court did not err in declining to instruct the jury, pursuant to 
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), that 
appellant was ineligible for parole was contrary to or an 
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unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.”  App. 
144.  We noted that “[j]urists of reason could debate whether 
the prosecutor argued future dangerousness, thereby 
triggering the need for the Simmons instruction.”  Id.  We 
also ordered the parties to brief whether the trial court’s 
failure to give a Simmons instruction would constitute 
harmless error under Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 
(1993).  We denied Robinson’s motion in all other respects.1 
 
II. 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Robinson’s 
habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and we 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 
2253.  Because the District Court did not hold an evidentiary 
hearing and relied on the state court record, we exercise 
plenary review.  See Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 231 
(3d Cir. 2004).  
 
 Section 2254(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) provides, in pertinent part, 
that: 
 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on 
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the 
judgment of a State court shall not be granted 
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated 
                                              
1  On May 20, 2013, Robinson filed a brief in this Court raising issues not 
encompassed in the certificates of appealability.  Robinson also asked us to 
expand the page and word limits for his brief and to expand the certificate of 
appealability.  We denied Robinson’s requests and ordered him to file a 
conforming brief, which he did on July 1, 2013.  The appellees contend that this 
brief is also nonconforming, because it is 63 pages rather than 30, see Fed. R. 
App. P. 32(a)(7)(A), and it raises an issue (ineffective assistance of counsel 
relating to the “grave risk” aggravating factor) not encompassed in the 
certificates of appealability.  See Appellees’ Supplemental Br. 2.   
 The appellees are correct that we cannot consider Robinson’s 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim because neither this Court nor the District 
Court granted a certificate of appealability on that issue.  As for page length, 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(A) provides:  “[a] principal brief 
may not exceed 30 pages, or a reply brief 15 pages, unless it complies with Rule 
32(a)(7)(B) and (C).”  Rule 37(a)(7)(B)(i) provides that “[a] principal brief is 
acceptable if:  it contains no more than 14,000 words.”  Robinson’s counsel 
submitted a certificate of compliance, pursuant to Rule 37(a)(7)(C), stating that 
the corrected brief contains 12,042 words.  Thus, Robinson’s brief conforms to 
the rules of this Court. 
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on the merits in State court proceedings unless 
the adjudication of the claim— 
 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States . . . . 
 
“This is a difficult to meet and highly deferential standard for 
evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court 
decisions be given the benefit of the doubt . . . .”  Cullen v. 
Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (quotation marks 
and citation omitted).  To determine whether a state court 
decision is contrary to clearly established law, “a federal 
court must consider whether the decision applies a rule that 
contradicts [such] law and how the decision confronts [the] 
set of facts that were before the state court.”  Id. at 1399 
(quotation marks omitted).  A state court decision is “contrary 
to [] clearly established precedent if the state court applies a 
rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme 
Court] cases,” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000), 
or “if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially 
indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and 
nevertheless arrives at a result different from [Supreme 
Court] precedent,” id. at 406.  “If the state court decision 
identifies the correct governing legal principle in existence at 
the time, a federal court must assess whether the decision 
unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the 
prisoner’s case.”  Cullen, 131 S. Ct. at 1399 (quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
 In order for § 2254(d)(1) to apply, the state court must 
have adjudicated a petitioner’s claim “on the merits.”  A state 
court’s decision is an adjudication on the merits where it is “a 
decision finally resolving the parties’ claims, with res judicata 
effect, that is based on the substance of the claim advanced, 
rather than on a procedural, or other, ground.”  Simmons v. 
Beard, 590 F.3d 223, 232 (3d Cir. 2009) (quotation marks 
omitted).  In such cases, the federal court’s review “is limited 
to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated 
the claim on the merits.”  Cullen, 131 S. Ct. at 1398.  If a 
petitioner’s claims were not adjudicated on the merits, they 
do not fall under § 2254(d)(1), and the federal court must 
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apply the pre-AEDPA standard, “reviewing pure legal 
questions and mixed questions of law and fact de novo” and 
presuming that the state court’s factual determinations are 
correct unless those factual determinations are rebutted by 
clear and convincing evidence.  Beard, 590 F.3d at 231. 
 
 In the present case, the District Court applied the 
deferential AEDPA standard to Robinson’s Simmons claim, 
but not to his claims regarding the “grave risk” aggravating 
circumstance.  We review de novo the District Court’s legal 
conclusion as to whether AEDPA deference applies.  Id.  In 
considering whether § 2254(d)(1) applies, we review the “last 
reasoned decision” of the state courts on the petitioner’s 
claims.  Id. at 231-32.  
 
III. 
 
 Robinson contends that the state impliedly argued his 
future dangerousness during the guilt and penalty phases of 
his trial.  Thus, Robinson argues, the trial court should have 
instructed the jury that “life imprisonment” under 
Pennsylvania law means “life imprisonment without parole.”   
 
A. 
 
 Robinson relies primarily on Simmons v. South 
Carolina to support his argument.  In Simmons, the defendant 
was convicted of capital murder for killing an elderly woman.  
512 U.S. at 156-57.  The defendant had a history of assaulting 
elderly women, and both defense and state witnesses agreed 
that the defendant posed a continuing danger to elderly 
women.  Id. at 157.  During the penalty phase of the 
defendant’s trial, the prosecutor stated that the question for 
the jury was “what to do with [the defendant] now that he is 
in our midst.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  The prosecutor 
urged that a death sentence would be “a response of society to 
someone who is a threat. Your verdict will be an act of self-
defense.”  Id.  Defense counsel requested a jury instruction 
regarding parole ineligibility, and the trial court denied this 
request.  Id. at 158-60.  During deliberations, the jury asked if 
a life sentence included the possibility of parole.  Id. at 160.  
The trial court instructed the jury not to consider parole or 
parole eligibility and told the jury that life imprisonment and 
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death should be understood in their plain and ordinary 
meaning.  Id.  The jury returned a death verdict.  Id. 
 
 A plurality of the Supreme Court ruled that, under 
these circumstances, due process required the trial judge to 
inform the jury that the defendant would not have been 
eligible for parole if sentenced to life imprisonment.  It held 
that, “where the defendant’s future dangerousness is at issue, 
and state law prohibits the defendant’s release on parole, due 
process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the 
defendant is parole ineligible.”  Id. at 156.  The plurality 
reasoned that “[t]he State may not create a false dilemma by 
advancing generalized arguments regarding the defendant’s 
future dangerousness while, at the same time, preventing the 
jury from learning that the defendant never will be released 
on parole.”  Id. at 171.   
 
 In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor phrased the 
dispositive question as whether “the prosecution argues that 
the defendant will pose a threat to society in the future.”  Id. 
at 177 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  This narrower view is 
controlling.  See, e.g., Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700, 716 
(3d Cir. 2005); Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F.3d 233, 265 (3d 
Cir.), rev’d on other grounds sub nom., Rompilla v. Beard, 
542 U.S. 966 (2004); see also Richmond v. Polk, 375 F.3d 
309, 331 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence in Simmons is controlling). 
 Eight years later, the Supreme Court considered 
whether a Simmons instruction should have been given in 
Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246 (2002).  In Kelly, the 
prosecutor told the jury in his opening statement:  “I hope you 
never in your lives again have to experience what you are 
experiencing right now.  Being some thirty feet away from 
such a person.  Murderer.”  Id. at 248 (quotation marks 
omitted).  The prosecutor also presented evidence that, while 
in prison, Kelly crafted a knife, attempted to escape, and 
planned to hold a female guard as a hostage.  Id.  In addition, 
the state relied upon evidence of “Kelly’s sadism at an early 
age, and his inclination to kill anyone who rubbed him the 
wrong way.”  Id. (citation omitted).  During closing 
arguments, the prosecutor referred to Kelly as “the butcher of 
Batesburg,” “Bloody Billy,” and “Billy the Kid,” and told the 
jury that Kelly “doesn’t have any mental illness.  He’s 
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intelligent . . . . He’s quick-witted.  Doesn’t that make 
somebody a little more dangerous . . . . [D]oesn’t that make 
him more unpredictable . . . . murderers will be murderers.  
And he is the cold-blooded one right over there.”  Id. at 249-
50.  The trial court did not give the jury a Simmons 
instruction.  Id. at 250. 
 
 The Supreme Court held that the trial court should 
have provided a parole ineligibility instruction because the 
state “accentuated the clear implication of future 
dangerousness raised by the evidence.”  Id. at 255.  The 
majority observed that “evidence of violent behavior in prison 
can raise a strong implication of ‘generalized . . . future 
dangerousness,’” so that “[a] jury hearing evidence of a 
defendant’s demonstrated propensity for violence reasonably 
will conclude that he presents a risk of violent behavior, 
whether locked up or free, and whether free as a fugitive or as 
a parolee.”  Id. at 253-54 (quoting Simmons, 512 U.S. at 
571).  The majority explained, moreover, that “[e]vidence of 
future dangerousness under Simmons is evidence with a 
tendency to prove dangerousness in the future; its relevance 
to that point does not disappear merely because it might 
support other inferences or be described in other terms.”  Id. 
at 254.   
 
 The Kelly dissenters, including two of the Justices who 
joined Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Simmons, 
argued that the Court had improperly extended the reach of 
Simmons.  Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Kennedy, 
observed that “the test is no longer whether the State argues 
future dangerousness to society; the test is now whether 
evidence was introduced at trial that raises an ‘implication’ of 
future dangerousness to society.”  Id. at 261 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting).  Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, 
dissented separately and asserted:  “the Court dilutes the 
Simmons test, now requiring that a parole ineligibility 
instruction be given where the prosecution makes arguments 
that have a ‘tendency to prove dangerousness in the future.’”  
Id. at 263 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  We have noted 
accordingly that Kelly “arguably broadened the holding in 
Simmons.”  Rompilla, 355 F.3d at 266; see also Bronshtein, 
404 F.3d at 716 (same).  
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B. 
 
 On direct appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
rejected Robinson’s argument that the trial court erred in 
declining to give a Simmons instruction.2  The court held that, 
“where the only references to the dangerousness of appellant 
relate to appellant’s past dangerousness a Simmons 
instruction is not necessary.”  Robinson I, 721 A.2d at 355.  
The court also reasoned that a Simmons instruction is 
necessary only when the future dangerousness of the 
defendant is “expressly implicated.”  Id.   Since the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court adjudicated Robinson’s claims 
on the merits, we will review its determination under the 
deferential standard set forth in § 2254(d)(1). 
 
1. 
 
 Robinson asserts, under § 2254(d)(1), that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court unreasonably applied Simmons 
when it held that future dangerousness is never placed at issue 
by references to a defendant’s prior conduct and must be 
“expressly implicated” to trigger the need for a Simmons 
instruction.    
 
 Under § 2254(d)(1), our review is limited to deciding 
whether a state court decision is contrary to or an 
unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent “as of 
the time of the relevant state-court decision.”  Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000); see also Greene v. Fisher, 
132 S. Ct. 38, 44 (2011) (“[Section] 2254(d)(1) requires 
federal courts to focus on what a state court knew and did . . . 
.” (quotation marks and alteration omitted)).  Since the 
Supreme Court decided Kelly after Robinson’s conviction 
became final, we must determine whether to apply Kelly in 
the instant matter.   
 
 Robinson argues that Kelly “did not create or apply 
any new rule of law, but simply applied the holding of 
                                              
2  Robinson also raised this argument in his PCRA petition.  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court determined that the claim was previously litigated and declined 
to consider it on the merits.  Robinson II, 877 A.2d at 439.  Therefore, he 
exhausted this claim in the state courts, as required by AEDPA.  See 28 U.S.C. § 
2254(b)(1)(A). 
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Simmons to the specific facts before it.”  Robinson Br. 34. 
Therefore, he suggests, we may consider Kelly in determining 
whether the state court’s application of Simmons was 
unreasonable.  Our prior case law, however, forecloses this 
argument.  As noted earlier, the Supreme Court decision in 
Kelly “arguably broadened the holding in Simmons.”  
Rompilla, 355 F.3d at 266; see also Bronshtein, 404 F.3d at 
716 (same).  Accordingly, we have declined to apply Kelly 
where a state court decision preceded it, Rompilla, 355 F.3d 
at 267, and we will not apply Kelly here.3 
2. 
 
 The fundamental takeaway from Simmons is that a 
jury cannot be presented with generalized arguments 
regarding the defendant’s future dangerousness while also 
being prevented from learning that the defendant will never 
be released on parole.  While we recognize that the evidence 
in many, if not all, capital cases will tend to show that a 
defendant may be dangerous in the future, Simmons does not 
require a parole ineligibility instruction in every case.  The 
state court’s view that a Simmons instruction is not necessary 
where the only references to a defendant’s dangerousness 
relate to his past conduct draws a reasonable limiting 
principle that is consistent with the concerns set forth by the 
Supreme Court.  Robinson I, 721 A.2d at 355.   
 
 Furthermore, the state court’s conclusion that the 
defendant’s future dangerousness must be “expressly 
implicated” to trigger the need for a parole ineligibility 
instruction comports with Justice O’Connor’s formulation of 
the Simmons rule.  512 U.S. at 177 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (requiring the trial court to ask whether “the 
prosecution argues that the defendant will pose a threat to 
                                              
3  At oral argument, Robinson’s counsel stated that resort to Kelly is 
unnecessary for Robinson’s claim to succeed.  In any event, even if we were to 
consider Kelly, that decision would not help Robinson.  The prosecutor’s 
statements were not comparable to those in Kelly, which clearly “invited [the 
jury] to infer ‘that petitioner [was] a vicious predator who would pose a 
continuing threat to the community.’”  Kelly, 534 U.S. at 256 (quoting 
Simmons, 512 U.S. at 176 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).  Unlike the prosecutor in 
Kelly, who presented evidence that Kelly had engaged in violent behavior even 
while incarcerated, the prosecutor at Robinson’s trial did not suggest to the jury 
that Robinson posed “a risk of violent behavior, whether locked up or free.”  Id. 
at 247.  
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society in the future”).  A prosecutor may “expressly 
implicate” a defendant’s future dangerousness – that is, he or 
she may argue it – without actually saying those particular 
words.     
 
 Unlike the prosecutor in Simmons, the prosecutor at 
Robinson’s trial made no explicit mention of Robinson’s 
ability to conform to society in the future.  The prosecutor’s 
statements characterizing Robinson as a “dangerous big city 
hoodlum,” as well as the evidence regarding Robinson’s 
ownership of guns and his criminal past, conveyed 
Robinson’s specific intent to kill Bass and Hodge.  See, e.g., 
App. 452 (“This is the image of a kind of person capable of 
forming specific intent to kill.”).  None of the prosecutor’s 
statements implied that the jury should elect to sentence 
Robinson to death as an act of self-protection.  Moreover, the 
prosecutor’s comment regarding aggravating circumstances – 
“[t]hat’s a serious thing that we have to stop” – conveyed the 
deterrent purposes of aggravating factors in a general sense.  
App. 543.   
 We agree with the District Court that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s rejection of Robinson’s Simmons claim 
cannot be disturbed under the narrow standard of review 
prescribed by AEDPA, and therefore we will affirm the 
District Court with respect to this claim.   
 
IV. 
 
Robinson’s remaining two arguments relate to 
Pennsylvania’s “grave risk” aggravating circumstance.  The 
Pennsylvania capital sentencing statute sets forth eighteen 
aggravating factors, including the following:  “[i]n the 
commission of the offense, the defendant knowingly created a 
grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim 
of the offense.”  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9711(d)(7).  The jury 
concluded unanimously that this aggravating circumstance 
applied to Robinson.  Robinson argues that:  (1) there was 
insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that the 
“grave risk” aggravating circumstance applied; and (2) the 
trial court failed to limit its jury instruction properly, 
rendering the aggravating circumstance vague and overbroad.   
 
A. 
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Before considering Robinson’s substantive arguments, 
we must determine whether they are properly before this 
Court and, if so, which standard of review applies.  It appears 
from Robinson’s briefs that he expects us to review his claims 
de novo.      
 
AEDPA requires a petitioner in state custody to 
exhaust all remedies available in the state courts before a 
federal court can grant his or her habeas petition.  28 U.S.C. § 
2254(b)(1)(A).  In Pennsylvania, a habeas corpus petitioner 
exhausts a claim by raising it either on direct appeal or in a 
petition under the PCRA.  See Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 
707, 717 (3d Cir. 2004).  In order to satisfy the exhaustion 
requirement, a petitioner must “fairly present[]” his or her 
federal claims to the state courts.  Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 
270, 275 (1971).  That is, the “petitioner must present a 
federal claim’s factual and legal substance to the state courts 
in a manner that puts them on notice that a federal claim is 
being asserted.”  McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 261 
(3d Cir. 1999).   
 
On direct appeal, Robinson did not raise any 
arguments pertaining to the “grave risk” aggravating 
circumstance.  However, under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
9711(h)(1), (3), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court must 
automatically review all death sentences and affirm a given 
death sentence “unless it determines that . . . the evidence 
fails to support the finding of at least one aggravating 
circumstance.”  In Robinson’s case, the court reviewed his 
death sentence and determined that “the evidence was 
sufficient to establish the aggravating factors found by the 
jury.”  Robinson I, 721 A.2d at 355.   
 
In his PCRA petition, Robinson expressly raised the 
arguments he now raises before this Court.  The Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court determined, however, that Robinson had 
“offer[ed] nothing that was not already reviewed by this 
Court on direct appeal.”  Robinson II, 877 A.2d at 439.  The 
court held that Robinson’s arguments relating to the “grave 
risk” aggravating circumstance had been “previously 
litigated” on direct appeal and thus declined to address his 
claims.  Id. at 438; see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9544(a)(2). 
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With regard to Robinson’s sufficiency of the evidence 
claim, we must decide whether the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s automatic review on direct appeal satisfied AEDPA’s 
exhaustion requirements.  In Bronshtein v. Horn, we rejected 
the argument that a claim could automatically be exhausted 
on direct appeal by virtue of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s mandatory appellate review in capital cases.  See 404 
F.3d at 726.  But in that case, the state court had considered 
the petitioner’s claims only under state law.  See id. (“[O]ur 
review of the state court record reveals that the arguments 
that Bronshtein made with respect to these issues were based 
entirely on state, rather than federal, law.  As a result, these 
claims were not properly exhausted.” (footnote omitted)).  In 
contrast, Robinson raises a straightforward sufficiency of the 
evidence claim, which is judged by the same standard under 
both Pennsylvania and federal law.  See Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U.S. 307, 322 (1979); Evans v. Court of Common Pleas, 
959 F.2d 1227, 1233 (3d Cir. 1992).  Therefore, we will 
consider this claim to be exhausted and review it under the 
deferential standard set forth in AEDPA.4  
 
Since no state court adjudicated Robinson’s jury 
instruction claim, the deferential AEDPA standard is 
inapplicable.  See Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 429 (3d Cir. 
2007).  We will thus review this claim de novo. 
 
B. 
 
                                              
4  The District Court declined to apply AEDPA’s exhaustion 
and procedural default requirements and reviewed this claim 
de novo, because the Commonwealth “deigned to provide the 
Court with only six sentences addressing [these claims]” and 
“neither addresse[d] these questions, nor provide[d] the Court 
with any citation to either the law or the record.”  Robinson, 
2011 WL 4592366, at *57 n.42.  Under AEDPA, “[a]n 
application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the 
merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust 
the remedies available in the courts of the State.”  28 U.S.C. § 
2254(b)(2).  Thus, the District Court did not err in reviewing 
this claim. 
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Robinson argues that there was insufficient evidence 
for the jury to find that the “grave risk” aggravating 
circumstance applied to his case, in violation of his rights 
under the Eighth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  He contends that, although shooting Hodge put 
her in danger, it did so before – not during – the commission 
of Bass’s murder.  He also suggests that the “grave risk” 
aggravating circumstance cannot apply in a situation where 
two victims are shot separately in different rooms.   
 
The capital sentencing statute places upon the 
Commonwealth the burden of proving every element of an 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt.  42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 9711(c)(1)(iii).  In considering whether the 
evidence supports a finding that the “grave risk” aggravating 
circumstance is applicable, the court reviews “the actor’s 
conduct to determine whether his conduct brought others into 
a life threatening situation.”  Commonwealth v. Thompson, 
739 A.2d 1023, 1029 (Pa. 1999) (quotation marks omitted).  
There must be a nexus connecting the “‘other persons’ to the 
zone of danger created by the defendants actions in killing the 
victim.”  Commonwealth v. Paolello, 665 A.2d 439, 457 (Pa. 
1995).  “It is not necessary that the endangered bystander be 
directly in the line of fire for a grave risk of death to occur.  
The potential for an errant, ricochet or pass-through bullet can 
create the requisite risk.”  Commonwealth v. Rios, 684 A.2d 
1025, 1036-37 (Pa. 1996) (quotation marks omitted). 
 
 Robinson relies heavily on the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Stokes, 615 A.2d 704 
(Pa. 1992), to support his arguments.  In Stokes, the evidence 
established that, while robbing a restaurant, Stokes locked 
four employees in a walk-in refrigerator and captured a fifth 
individual.  Id. at 707-08.  After determining that he had been 
identified, and resolving to kill the witnesses to his crime, 
Stokes opened the refrigerator door and fired shots into the 
refrigerator, killing two of the employees.  Id. at 708.  The 
fifth individual escaped from the kitchen and ran to the front 
door of the restaurant.  Stokes cornered this individual at the 
locked front door and fired three more shots, killing him.  Id.  
Stokes was charged with three counts of first degree murder.  
Id. 
 
18 
 
 At the penalty phase of Stokes’s trial, the trial judge 
instructed the jury that for each count of murder, the killing of 
the two other victims would satisfy the “grave risk” 
aggravating circumstance.  Id. at 713.  The jury found two 
aggravating circumstances, including the “grave risk” 
aggravating circumstance, and no mitigating circumstances as 
to each of the three indictments.  Id. at 712.  The trial court 
imposed upon Stokes three consecutive sentences of death.  
Id.  On direct appeal, the  Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
reversed the jury’s finding, because the manner in which the 
trial court charged the jury with respect to the “grave risk” 
aggravating circumstance “precluded the jury from properly 
analyzing the applicability of that circumstance to the facts of 
this case.”  Id. at 714.  The court noted that the “grave risk” 
aggravating circumstance could have applied only to the 
murders committed in the refrigerator, while it was 
“completely inapplicable” to the murder committed at the 
front door of the restaurant.  Id.  
 
 Robinson suggests that, under Stokes, the factfinder 
must conduct a formalistic spatial inquiry to determine 
whether the “grave risk” aggravating circumstance applies.  
But Stokes does not stand for that proposition.  The 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court deemed the “grave risk” 
aggravating circumstance inapplicable to the murder 
committed at the front door not only because it occurred a 
significant distance away from where the other individuals 
were located, but also because the defendant closed the 
refrigerator door before moving to the front of the restaurant, 
minimizing the possibility of a ricochet bullet.  Id.  The court 
also made clear that the jury must conduct a fact-specific 
inquiry to determine whether the “grave risk” aggravating 
circumstance applies.  Id. 
 
 Furthermore, Robinson’s reading of Stokes does not 
comport with the principles set forth in other Pennsylvania 
cases.  Indeed, rather than focus merely on the physical 
proximity between the “other person” and the murder victim, 
Pennsylvania courts have looked more generally at whether 
there is a link between the risk of danger to the “other person” 
and the murder of the victim.  See Paolello, 665 A.2d at 457 
(requiring a “nexus . . . connecting the ‘other persons’ to the 
zone of danger created by the [petitioner’s] actions in killing 
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the victim”); see also Commonwealth v. Counterman, 719 
A.2d 284, 305 (Pa. 1998) (holding that by setting fire to his 
house and preventing his three children from escaping, the 
defendant created grave risk of death to his wife, firefighters, 
and neighbors, none of whom were trapped in the house); 
Commonwealth v. Wharton, 607 A.2d 710, 723-24 (Pa. 1992) 
(concluding that defendants created grave risk of death to 
infant, after having killed infant’s parents, by abandoning 
infant in house with heat turned off in February); 
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 599 A.2d 624, 628 (Pa. 1991) 
(holding that individuals sleeping upstairs were put at grave 
risk of death even though murder occurred downstairs).   
 
 Under this interpretation, reasonable jurors could have 
found that Robinson assaulted Hodge in the process of getting 
to Bass because Hodge attempted to block him.  In addition, 
as Hodge lay unconscious in the adjoining bedroom just a few 
feet away, Robinson fired seven bullets at Bass, at least one 
of which passed through the bathroom wall and into the 
kitchen.  Although no bullets passed into the bedroom, Hodge 
certainly could have been struck by a ricochet or pass-through 
bullet.  The fact that she did not actually get shot again does 
not lessen the risk that she faced at the time.   
 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s 
holding that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was reasonable 
in deciding that there was sufficient evidence to support the 
jury’s finding of the “grave risk” aggravating circumstance.   
 
C. 
 
Robinson asserts, finally, that the “grave risk” 
aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally overbroad and 
vague, and that the trial court erred when it did not provide 
guidance to the jury on how to apply this aggravating 
circumstance beyond the words of the statute.5  He relies on 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 202 (1976), a case in which 
the Supreme Court noted that a similar Georgia statute “might 
be susceptible of an overly broad interpretation,” and argues 
that the instruction given at his trial suffered from the 
vagueness problem identified in Gregg.  See Robinson Br. 49.   
                                              
5 We note that Robinson’s brief devotes only one paragraph to this argument. 
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Claims of vagueness directed at aggravating 
circumstances are analyzed under the Eighth Amendment.  
An aggravating circumstance is constitutional if it both:  (1) 
applies “only to a subclass of defendants convicted of 
murder”; and (2) is not unconstitutionally vague.  Tuilaepa v. 
California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994).  In defining 
“unconstitutionally vague,” we impose a “quite deferential” 
standard of review, looking to whether the factor “has some 
common-sense core of meaning . . . that criminal juries 
should be capable of understanding.”  Id. at 973 (quotation 
marks omitted).  Vagueness challenges to statutes not 
threatening First Amendment interests are examined in light 
of the facts of the case at hand.  Such statutes are “judged on 
an as-applied basis.”  Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 
361 (1988).  We focus on “whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instructions 
in a way that violates the Constitution.”  Estelle v. McGuire, 
502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quotation marks omitted).   
 
Pennsylvania’s “grave risk” aggravating circumstance 
is not overbroad on its face.  The Supreme Court has 
routinely rejected vagueness challenges to aggravating 
circumstances, including the standard “grave risk” 
aggravating circumstance.  See, e.g., Proffitt v. Florida, 428 
U.S. 242, 256.6  The language of the Pennsylvania statute is 
not difficult to understand or lacking in a “common-sense 
core of meaning.”  Criminal juries should be able to 
comprehend and apply this language straightforwardly.   
 
Moreover, the “grave risk” aggravating circumstance 
was not applied unconstitutionally in Robinson’s case.  The 
trial court told the jury that the “grave risk” aggravating 
circumstance applied if “in the commission of the criminal 
homicide defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death 
to Tara Hodge and in addition to Rashawn Bass who was the 
victim of the offense.”  App. 560-61.  This language mirrors 
the statute almost exactly, and like the statute itself, gave the 
jury sufficient guidance as to how to apply the law.  All of the 
words in the Pennsylvania statute have plain meanings that 
                                              
6  Indeed, even though the Court in Gregg pointed out the potential vagueness 
issue with a similar “grave risk” aggravating factor, it ultimately upheld the 
statute as constitutional.  See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 207.   
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would be understandable to the average juror.  Thus, 
Robinson cannot show – and indeed, he has provided no 
arguments to support – that there is a “reasonable likelihood” 
that the jury applied the instruction in an unconstitutional 
manner.   
 
 We agree with the District Court that the trial court did 
not err when it provided instructions to the jury on the “grave 
risk” aggravating circumstance.  We will affirm the District 
Court’s holding with respect to this claim. 
 
V. 
 
 For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court. 
